Here's an interesting blog-like site about ethics. There are a couple UMass graduates involved with it. If you scroll down to the "Comments" section or just search "Feldman", there's a bit about World Utilitarianism, mostly in relation to another Utilitarian theory.
http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2004/12/a_puzzle_about_.html
Sep 24, 2007
Sep 20, 2007
Accessibility?
Can we get a list going of the various questions/issues that were discussed in class concerning accessibility? I'm having trouble remembering. In what ways did we find this notion to be problematic?
Sep 12, 2007
Do Indeterministic Cases Pose A Problem for World Utilitarianism?
Yesterday in class, the question came up of whether indeterministic events might cause problems for Fred’s theory. World utilitarianism is roughly the view that it is morally obligatory at a time t to do something iff it is what one does in the best possible world (or possible worlds, since there could be ties for first place) that one has access to at t.
The set-up: John stands in front of a button and can either push it or not. If John does not push the button, +500 units of value are guaranteed to result. If he does push the button, a roulette wheel will spin. (Assume roulette is a genuinely indeterministic phenomenon.) If the wheel lands on red, then +1,000 units of value will result. But if it lands on black, then –15,000,000 units of value will result. What possible worlds does John have access to? We haven’t been given a precise account of accessibility, but let us assume that John has access to three possible worlds. W1, in which John does not press the button, is worth +500. W2, in which John presses the button and the wheel lands on red, is worth +1,000. W3, in which John presses the button and the wheel lands on black, is worth –15,000,000.
In class we discussed the possibility that WU might yield the result that pushing the button is both obligatory and not obligatory. However, I am unable to see how that could be the case. WU seems to yield just one result with respect to pushing the button: it is obligatory. After all, this is what John does in the best possible world accessible to him. (It is also happens to be what he does in the worst possible world accessible to him, but that is neither here nor there.) Thus I do not think WU has any contradictory implications about this case.
Nonetheless, one might think that the result that WU yields is unintuitive. Perhaps one has the intuition that pushing the button is not obligatory. (After all, the possible benefits clearly do not outweigh the risks it involves.) Thus WU might give the wrong result in this case. As far as I can tell, if indeterministic cases present a problem for Fred’s theory, it would be a substantial one like this.
What do you guys think?
The set-up: John stands in front of a button and can either push it or not. If John does not push the button, +500 units of value are guaranteed to result. If he does push the button, a roulette wheel will spin. (Assume roulette is a genuinely indeterministic phenomenon.) If the wheel lands on red, then +1,000 units of value will result. But if it lands on black, then –15,000,000 units of value will result. What possible worlds does John have access to? We haven’t been given a precise account of accessibility, but let us assume that John has access to three possible worlds. W1, in which John does not press the button, is worth +500. W2, in which John presses the button and the wheel lands on red, is worth +1,000. W3, in which John presses the button and the wheel lands on black, is worth –15,000,000.
In class we discussed the possibility that WU might yield the result that pushing the button is both obligatory and not obligatory. However, I am unable to see how that could be the case. WU seems to yield just one result with respect to pushing the button: it is obligatory. After all, this is what John does in the best possible world accessible to him. (It is also happens to be what he does in the worst possible world accessible to him, but that is neither here nor there.) Thus I do not think WU has any contradictory implications about this case.
Nonetheless, one might think that the result that WU yields is unintuitive. Perhaps one has the intuition that pushing the button is not obligatory. (After all, the possible benefits clearly do not outweigh the risks it involves.) Thus WU might give the wrong result in this case. As far as I can tell, if indeterministic cases present a problem for Fred’s theory, it would be a substantial one like this.
What do you guys think?
Welcome!
This website is meant to serve as a discussion forum for Professor Graham's graduate seminar on Moral Obligation. Any issue pertaining to the class is fair game. Happy philosophicating!
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